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Racism as Disrespect*
Joshua Glasgow
Racism can be subtle or overt, it can be intentional or unintentional,
and it can be conscious or unconscious. Actions can be racist. Policies
can be racist. Arguably even whole countries can be racist. And, of
course, people can be racist. While there is some excitement over the
proposition that only the most powerful members of a society can be
racist within it, a consensus seems to be emerging that just about anyone
can be racist. Perhaps, then, as racism is capable of worming its way
into so many diverse corners of life, it should not come as a surprise
that there is considerable disagreement over what is common to racism’s
variegated forms. Indeed, some recent writings embrace the prospect
that the nature of racism may resist being captured in a single, monistic
formula.1
Here I want to go against that trend and propose a unified account
of racism. The essence of my proposal is that racism can be understood
in terms of disrespect. A couple of background methodological principles are assumed in making the case for this proposal. As an attempt
to capture the content of our current, ordinary concept of racism, the
adequacy criterion operative here is that an analysis should accommodate ordinary usage of relevant terms, terms like ‘racism’. I will return
to this point at the end of the article, but privileging analyses that
accommodate ordinary usage does not entail that we cannot make mistakes in how we deploy the relevant terms—a point that is especially
* Prior versions of this article were presented at Claremont-McKenna College and
the Bay Area Forum for Law and Ethics (BAFFLE). I am grateful to the participants in
those sessions, as well as to J. L. A. Garcia, Sally Haslanger, Edouard Machery, anonymous
referees for Ethics, and several of Ethics’ associate editors, for valuable feedback that
prompted improvements to this article.
1. Lawrence Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” in Racism in Mind, ed.
Michael P. Levine and Tamas Pataki (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 56–77;
Clevis Headley, “Philosophical Approaches to Racism: A Critique of the Individualistic
Perspective,” Journal of Social Philosophy 31 (2000): 223–57, and “Philosophical Analysis
and the Problem of Defining Racism,” Philosophia Africana 9 (2006): 1–16; Paul Taylor,
Race: A Philosophical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
Ethics 120 (October 2009): 64–93
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salient when the term in question is often used in contested ways, as is
the case with ‘racism’. Instead, the adequacy criterion merely states that,
other things equal, the more that an analysis can accommodate ordinary
usage, the better. Thus, the basic argument for my analysis is that it
accommodates ordinary usage better than rival views do, as measured
by cases that are intended to resonate with the reader. Some defenders
of rival views will perhaps see revising ordinary usage as an acceptable
by-product of other concerns or commitments. Such moves are understandable, but I maintain that those revisions nonetheless count as a
cost of those views. At the same time, since this measure of adequacy
requires that other things have to be equal, I will also try to show that
my account captures some features commonly attributed to racism, including most prominently its apparent immorality. I begin with three
analytical desiderata that emerge from considering some alternative accounts of racism.
I. THE LANDSCAPE AND THREE OBJECTIVES
A. The Location Problem: Cognitive, Behavioral, and Attitudinal Accounts
One intuitive and popular view gives racism a cognitive or doxastic
analysis, according to which racism always ultimately traces to, in one
way or another, a certain kind of belief, ideology, theory, doctrine, or
judgment, such as the belief that a race is inferior or worthy of exclusion
from full political participation.2 While there is much to be said on
behalf of cognitivist accounts, it appears that they are uniformly vulnerable to counterexamples. J. L. A. Garcia has repeatedly called to our
attention the case of a racist who simply hates black people without
harboring any beliefs or judgments about them.3 We can similarly imagine a person who has not internalized any racist beliefs or judgments
but who consistently and without justification treats members of his own
race preferentially. Thus the point of Garcia’s examples can be driven
home by considering someone who, when accused of being racist be2. Harry M. Bracken, “Philosophy and Racism,” Philosophia 8 (1978): 241–60; Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism: Principles for a Multi-Racial Society (New York: Free Press,
1996); David Theo Goldberg, “Racism and Rationality: The Need for a New Critique,”
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (1990): 317–50; Tommie Shelby, “Is Racism in the
‘Heart’?” Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (2002): 411–20.
3. J. L. A. Garcia, “Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some
Recent Social Philosophy,” Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (1997): 5–42, 13, “Racism as a
Model for Understanding Sexism,” in Race/Sex: Their Sameness, Difference, and Interplay,
ed. Naomi Zack (New York: Routledge, 1997): 45–59, 49, “Philosophical Analysis and
the Moral Concept of Racism,” Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (1999): 1–32, 4, 10,
“Racism and Racial Discourse,” Philosophical Forum 32 (2001): 125–45, 135–36, and
“Three Sites for Racism: Social Structurings, Valuings, and Vice,” in Levine and Pataki,
Racism in Mind, 35–55, 39–40, 43, 45.
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cause he is perpetually and exclusively hateful of nonwhites, responds
by saying, “But I don’t believe anything racist about nonwhites.” For
many such people we will, of course, suspect that they do hold racist
beliefs. But it would not be beside the point to additionally insist, “Even
if that’s true, your hatred is by itself racist.” These cases suggest that, at
least as a conceptual matter, it is possible for racism to be found in
noncognitive attitudes or behaviors.
In his defense of an ideological account, Tommie Shelby suggests
that, while racist hatred might not have to be accompanied by a wellformed belief, it is intelligible only if it exists against a widespread, background racist social ideology. However, it does seem that a person in a
thoroughly nonracist closed society, who has formed no racist beliefs,
could have a unique hatred toward people of other races. Shelby holds
that such attitudes would be “puzzling” and that such a person might
have to be “psychotic.”4 But even if we grant that such a person is psychotic,
his attitudes might still be racist. We can, for example, imagine a world
that became racist because of some first racist, who rationalized his psychotic racist hatred of (say) nonwhites by formulating, ex post, a doctrine
of white supremacy. There is, prior to the attempted rationalization, no
judgment that grounds his apparently racist hatred, but, as it is hatred
of nonwhites as nonwhites, it still appears to be racist.5
One alternative to cognitivism is some sort of behavioral account,
such as that provided by Michael Philips, according to whom “‘racist’ is
used in its logically primary sense when it is attributed to actions. All other
uses of ‘racist’, I believe, must be understood directly or indirectly in
relation to this one.”6 But while Philips marshals several points in favor of
this understanding, Garcia’s counterexample to cognitivism has the same
force for behaviorism: someone who deeply hated some other race but
who was unable, whether through an internal or external mechanism, to
act in a racist manner should be considered racist all the same. Impotence
in directing, or even in intending to direct, one’s racism toward a target
does not render one’s racism any less racist. To make this point, John
Arthur has us imagine a racist stuck on a deserted island without anyone

4. Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?” 415. Cf. Lewis Gordon, Bad Faith and Antiblack
Racism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1995), 79.
5. This is not the place to give a theory of the emotions, but I should acknowledge
that I am claiming here that emotions like racial hatred can manifest themselves in
ways that do not include racist cognitive elements. Notice, however, that this claim
allows that we might have to harbor some nonracist beliefs in order to harbor hatred,
be it racial or any other kind of hatred (cf. n. 12 below).
6. Michael Philips, “Racist Acts and Racist Humor,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy
14 (1984): 75–96, 77 (emphasis in original).
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toward whom he can direct his racism,7 and it is not farfetched to suspect
that some people in our midst resist acting on their racist attitudes simply
in order to avoid earning a bad reputation. Since we can certainly conceive
of such people, it appears to be conceptually possible for racism to exist
without racist behavior.8
With these kinds of considerations as his evidence, Garcia has argued, over a series of articles, that racism is essentially found “in the
heart.”9 That is, for Garcia racism is at bottom always derived from
noncognitive states, which I will refer to generally as ‘attitudes’. (This
label is somewhat misleading, since, of course, beliefs are attitudes, too,
but it has the virtue of economy.) More specifically, “racism, at its core
. . . consists in racial disregard, including disrespect, or most gravely,
ill will. Racially based or racially informed disregard (or ill will) is an
indifference (or opposition) to another’s welfare on account of the
racial group to which she is assigned.” Because racism on this account
boils down to a person’s wishes, wills, and wants, Garcia labels his view
a “volitional conception,” one that is meant to capture the many ways
in which racism can be vicious, and in particular offend “against the
moral virtues of benevolence and justice.”10
Of course, the volitional conception is only one way of specifying an
attitudinal account. Arthur, for further example, analyzes racism as “racial
contempt in the form of either hostility or indifference.”11 But while
attitudinal accounts like these can accommodate the hate-filled racist, it
is not clear that they can capture the phenomena to which cognitivism
and behaviorism are most responsive, namely, racist beliefs and actions.
As Lawrence Blum notes, it seems that practices, among other things, can
be racist even when they are not generated by racist attitudes; and Shelby
and Charles Mills point out that we can imagine a well-intentioned racist
who nonetheless persists in having racist beliefs.12 This last kind of case
7. John Arthur, Race, Equality, and the Burdens of History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 17.
8. Gordon understands racism as a certain kind of choice to have certain beliefs
(Bad Faith, 2). Garcia-style counterexamples are compelling against this kind of view,
whether we understand it as focusing on the belief chosen or on the act of choosing
(see Garcia, “Philosophical Analysis,” 7–10).
9. Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” in Racism, ed. Leonard Harris (Amherst, NY:
Humanity, 1999): 398–434, “Current Conceptions,” “Racism as a Model,” “Philosophical
Analysis,” and “Three Sites.”
10. Garcia, “Three Sites,” 43, 45.
11. Arthur, Race, Equality, and the Burdens of History, 14.
12. Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” 72; Shelby, “Is Racism in the
‘Heart’?” 418; Charles W. Mills, “‘Heart’ Attack: A Critique of Jorge Garcia’s Volitional
Conception of Racism,” Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 29–62, 51–57; cf. Philips, “Racist Acts,”
89–90. These objections differ from the objection that the racist has to have some
relevant beliefs, such as beliefs about the racial identity of the target of the racism (Mills,
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can be given some flesh by imagining a good-hearted person who ignorantly believes that the members of some other race are uniformly lazy
or unintelligent. Garcia insists that, in the absence of “any contempt or
insensitivity,” we should not call such a belief racist.13 But this puts considerable strain on our usage of the term: it does not manifest conceptual
confusion to claim, for instance, that some white people have held racist
beliefs about black people without being contemptuous of, or even insensitive to, them. They may have simply been nonnegligently ignorant.
(Mills compellingly argues that at least some white racists have had truly
benevolent aims that were corrupted by false beliefs about the inferiority
of nonwhites, but if this does not fit your understanding of real-world
racism, imagine a less malevolent version of it.)
At times Garcia responds to the objection that nonnegligently ignorant people can perform racist acts or perpetuate racism by maintaining
that “mere causation is without moral import.”14 However, acting in ignorance is not tantamount to merely being a causal toggle without moral
import. If I utter something to a friend that is meant to be complimentary
but comes off as insulting, given linguistic norms of which I am ignorant,
my remark is no less insulting just by virtue of the fact that I did not have
“‘Heart’ Attack,” 37). This latter objection appears not to be decisive, for Garcia’s
attitudinal thesis is consistent with the claim that racism is exclusively found in attitudes
that are, as it happens, always accompanied by certain nonracist but race-related beliefs.
This point notwithstanding, it is worth noting a further objection from Mills (“‘Heart’
Attack,” 42–51): race-related ill will is sometimes not racist, such as when a nonwhite
person who has observed a great deal of white racism holds that most white people are
bad and should be punished for their racist crimes. Among other implications, Mills
notes that cases like these show that whether an attitude is racist often depends on
what beliefs ground the attitude.
13. Garcia, “Three Sites,” 38; cf. Garcia, “Philosophical Analysis,” 5, and “Racism
and Racial Discourse,” 133–34. Thomas W. Schmid (“The Definition of Racism,” Journal
of Applied Philosophy 13 [1996]: 31–40) agrees that beliefs and behaviors borne out of
ignorance cannot be racist. Schmid also holds that one is a “true racist” only if one
rejects evidence that exposes heretofore unknown evidential or rational flaws in one’s
racism ( 36–37). K. A. Appiah (“Racisms,” in Anatomy of Racism, ed. David Theo Goldberg
[Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990], 3–17, 8) and Garcia (“Current
Conceptions,” 15–16), following him, adopt a similar line, such that if a heretofore
ignorant person gives up his racist-seeming beliefs in the light of new evidence, he
(Appiah says nothing about the belief itself, but only about the person) should not be
considered racist. While this may be appropriate as a judgment about the person, as a
judgment about the belief it seems excessively narrow: it does not appear conceptually
confused for someone to say, “That compelling evidence is new to me; I am embarrassed
that I endorsed racist beliefs until just now; I hope you will forgive my ignorance.” (Cf.
Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ”: The Moral Quandary of Race [Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2002], 183 n. 7.) Furthermore, it may even be too narrow as a judgment
about the person, for it seems the same person could coherently say, “I am ashamed
that I used to be an ignorant racist; at least I can take comfort in the fact that I stopped
being a racist once I became fully informed.”
14. Garcia, “Three Sites,” 49; cf. Garcia, “Heart of Racism,” 410–11.
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insult in my heart. (Although, of course, I may be less insulting as a person
by virtue of my good intentions.) Garcia also suggests that the well-meaning paternalistic racist (one particularly salient version of the ignorant
racist) “acts with the instrumental intention of stunting and infantilizing
the ‘beneficiary’ she victimizes. So we should not assume that immoral
paternalism involves nothing that offends against the virtues of goodwill.”15 But surely we can at least imagine a paternalist who does not intend
to stunt or infantilize the object of his paternalism. The paternalist may
in fact think that paternalism is the only way to avoid stunting or infantilizing the object of his paternalism. Such a thought might even be
grounded on the best evidence that the paternalist could reasonably obtain. In these cases, then, it is at least conceptually possible for there to
be what some call “benevolent racists.”16
In short, we call beliefs ‘racist’ even when they neither issue in
racist behavior nor issue from racist noncognitive attitudes; we call attitudes ‘racist’ even when they fail to effect racist behavior and are
unaccompanied by racist beliefs; and we call some behavior ‘racist’ even
when it takes place in the absence of racist beliefs or attitudes. Thus,
despite the hard-won gains made by the various cognitivist, behaviorist,
and attitudinal proposals put forth in recent years, there seems to be a
residual location problem : it seems difficult to figure out where—beliefs,
attitudes, behaviors—racism is fundamentally located. This problem
gives rise to our first objective: we should find an analysis that can make
room for the various apparently irreducible locations of racism.
One strategy for solving the location problem is to hybridize. Michael
Dummett, for example, conjoins behavioral and attitudinal elements
when he holds that racism, “in the strict sense of the word,” always comes
down to “prejudice against one or more racial groups that manifests itself
in hostile behavior toward all members of those groups (or, sometimes,
toward all but a very few rich or powerful ones),” where ‘prejudice’ covers
desires, reluctances, states of disgust or hatred, and so on. In a different
but equally conjunctive manner, J. Angelo Corlett has adopted a selfstyled “cognitive-behavioral theory of racism,” according to which a racist
is, necessarily, someone who both has prejudicial beliefs or attitudes and
who acts on them in a discriminatory manner.17 The problem with con15. Garcia, “Racism and Racial Discourse,” 142 n. 22, cf. 137.
16. Cf. Mills, “‘Heart’ Attack.”
17. Michael Dummett, “The Nature of Racism,” in Levine and Pataki, Racism in Mind,
27–34, 28; J. Angelo Corlett, Race, Racism, and Reparations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2003), chap. 4. Schmid might also be plausibly read as advancing the hybrid view that
being racist involves not only an action (“the infliction of unequal consideration”) but also
an attitude (“the desire to dominate”). George Frederickson’s otherwise behaviorist account
is also conjunctive insofar as he makes it a condition of racism that the racist group must
believe that the group it seeks to dominate is characterized by “differences that [the racist
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junctive approaches is that they are even less capable than nonconjunctive
analyses of accommodating phenomena ordinarily identified as racist.
Requiring that any instance of racism have both features F and G (say
prejudicial belief and discriminatory behavior), where F and G are not
coextensive, will only exclude even more phenomena from being racist
than are excluded by requiring either simply F or simply G.18
Thus, given the diversity of racist phenomena, the natural maneuver
seems to be to disjoin the various analysans that individually are incomplete. That is, we seem pushed toward a cluster-style analysis. Lawrence
Blum, for example, suggests that racism always “can be related to” either
inferiorization, which seems to be the content of a belief or doctrine
(Blum is not explicit on this question), or antipathy, a noncognitive attitude.19 However, this particular disjunctive account appears to exclude
some of what we ordinarily consider racism. For instance, it seems coherent to describe as racist the kind of comment that comes from those
too quick with the benevolent, but ignorant, stereotype. Blum is clear
that he doesn’t think positive stereotypes can be racist (although they
can still be, on his account, objectionable), as they are not instances of
antipathy or inferiorization.20 This stance renders Blum’s account unable
to accommodate those remarks that we often call ‘racist’, not because
they put down the target racialized group, but because they homogenize
that group.21
group] believes are hereditary and unalterable,” in Racism: A Short History (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 170; cf. Appiah, “Racisms.”
18. Corlett is particularly concerned with analyzing the kind of racism that can be legally
prohibited, and although this constraint might make a narrowly behavioral account more
appropriate for these narrower concerns, it is unclear how beliefs can be legally prohibited,
and it is unclear why he takes a narrowly law-oriented analysis to be a rival of analyses that
simply aim to analyze racism tout court (such as those advanced by Appiah and Blum).
19. Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ,” 8. A condensed version of Blum’s view can be
found in Blum, “Racism: What It Is and What It Isn’t,” Studies in Philosophy and Education 21
(2002): 203–18. It should be noted that in “I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ,” 7–8, Blum does hedge
his bets, holding that, while his account is meant to capture the “core meaning,” usage of
‘racism’ is so varied that we cannot get to “the ‘true meaning’ of ‘racism,’” and in “Systemic
and Individual Racism, Racialization, and Antiracist Education: A Reply to Garcia, Silliman,
and Levinson,” Theory and Research in Education 2 (2004): 49–74, he holds that the search
for the “core meaning” of racism may be fruitless. He sometimes also indicates that his
analysis attempts to balance ordinary usage of the term ‘racism’ with the goal of providing
the most useful way of construing racism, and to the extent that this aim is not so much to
descriptively analyze the concept racism as to provide a prescription for better usage, our
views are not inconsistent, as I discuss below in Sec. III. For the time being, I proceed on
the supposition that it is instructive to examine whether Blum’s account could be descriptively
adequate. (I use small caps to name concepts and single quotes when mentioning words.)
20. Blum, “Racism,” 211.
21. A prominent professional football player, Reggie White, was excoriated along just
these lines, when he meant to issue the following ‘compliments’: “[White] said that Hispanic
people ‘are gifted at family structure. You can see a Hispanic person and he can put 20 or
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And, to step back from the trees for a moment, it seems as though
most parties to this discussion would prefer that we converge on a monistic analysis, other things being equal. It’s not that cluster analyses
are necessarily bankrupt; rather, it’s that they are analyses of last resort.
We might, for example, patch up Blum’s analysis by saying that all
instances of racism are instances of antipathy or inferiorization or homogenization. But we know where this leads: for each new counterexample, we need a new patch, and while an indefinitely completed disjunction of patches might be the best we can get, it is not the best we
can hope for. (Homogenization is not likely to be the only patch needed
for Blum’s account. Arthur points out that being indifferent is a way of
being racist, and racism can also be found in marginalization and exclusion.)22 Some go further than this and hold that cluster analyses are
downright unacceptable. Garcia insists that ‘racism’ cannot be a “family
resemblance” word, since then two kinds of racism might have nothing
in common, in which case, “there can be little reason to think racism
as such, i.e., every racism, is morally objectionable.”23 I don’t follow this
reasoning, for otherwise disparate forms of racism might have distinctive
morally objectionable features. Nevertheless, I share the preference for
a monistic analysis, other things being equal, so I want to remain open
to the possibility that the different forms of racism so far considered
might be unified in some way.24
B. Institutional Racism, the Location Problem Expanded, and
the Second Objective
Before getting to a unified account, note the further and more fundamental point that cognitivist, attitudinal, and behaviorist accounts, as
30 people in one home.’ Asians, he said, know how to ‘turn a television into a watch.’
American Indians, he said, ‘have been very gifted’ in ‘spirituality’.” “Remarks by Packers’
White Draw Criticism in Wisconsin,” New York Times, March 26, 1998; http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?resp9503E6D91F38F935A15750C0A96E958260#. An interesting question on this front is whether all (or maybe only all false) racially homogenizing
but well-intended statements are racist; I don’t address this question here.
22. Arthur, Race, Equality, and the Burdens of History, 15.
23. Garcia, “Racism and Racial Discourse,” 129; cf. 127–28, “Philosophical Analysis,”
21 n. 8.
24. In my contrast between monistic and cluster analyses, I am assuming a broad understanding of cluster analyses. On this understanding, a cluster analysis might consist of a
disjunction not only of a few properties that are separately sufficient for racism but also of
simply all of the properties of being all of the (otherwise irreducible) particular instances
of racism. The latter case, where ‘racism’ turns out to be something like a directly referring
term, is plausibly the limit case of a cluster concept, but in any event that is how I am using
the term here. So a concept might have monistic content (a property or conjunction of
properties that details necessary and sufficient conditions for membership), pluralistic content (a possibly very long disjunction of properties that detail separately sufficient conditions
for membership, including potentially just being i instance of racism, disjoined for every i), or
no content.
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well as hybridized versions of them, all share a common focus on what
Sally Haslanger has called “agent oppression.” I’ll modify Haslanger’s
label and say that the cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral accounts are
all committed to agent-based analyses of racism. That is, whether we
focus on a racist belief, attitude, or behavior, each of these is manifested
in people.25
As a group, agent-based analyses might be open to certain counterexamples involving institutional racism.26 To be sure, some instances
of institutional racism won’t present a problem for agent-based accounts,
namely, those where the institutional racism is traceable to agent-based
racism. For instance, Haslanger identifies Jim Crow segregation policies
as a form of institutional (or, on her parsing, structural) racism, and
Jim Crow laws were unquestionably enacted and sustained by agents
seeking to entrench a white supremacist social order in the United
States.27 This traceability allows Garcia to make theoretical space for
institutional racism by stating that, on his account, “institutional racism
exists when and insofar as an institution is racist in the aims, plans, and
the like that people give it, especially when their racism informs its
behavior. . . . What matters is that racist attitudes contaminate the operation of the institution; it is irrelevant what its original point may have
been, what its designers meant it to do. If it does not operate from
those [racist] motives (at time T1), then it does not embody institutional
racism (at T1).”28
So on this kind of theory, for any slice of time, all institutional
racism derives from agent-based (and, on Garcia’s particular theory,
attitudinal) racism operative at that time. I’ll call such theories ‘reductionist’. To show that reductionism is false, it must be shown that, while
institutional racism may often be perpetuated by racist agents, it need
not be (as Haslanger suggests). That is, antireductionism requires cases
of “pure” institutional racism, cases where the racism “bottoms out” at
the institutional level. Consider
Real Estate. For centuries, members of R1 systematically targeted the
economic resources of members of R2 for (unjust) suppression, first
through a state-supported system of slavery, then through a statesupported system of segregation. Eventually, there was a racial rapprochement, where all state-supported means of R2’s economic re25. Sally Haslanger, “Oppressions: Racial and Other,” in Levine and Pataki, Racism in
Mind, 97–123. Haslanger uses the term ‘individualistic approach’ to mark this class of theories.
I use ‘agent-based’ only in order to capture the point, driven home by Haslanger among
others, that groups as well as individuals can be the agents of racism and oppression.
26. Cf. Headley, “Philosophical Approaches.”
27. Haslanger, “Oppressions,” 101.
28. Garcia, “Heart of Racism,” 404, cf. 416–18, 423–24, “Racism as a Model,” 50, “Philosophical Analysis,” 16–18, “Racism and Racial Discourse,” 136–37, and “Three Sites,” 51.
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pression (including criminal laws, voting rights, and tax-and-transfer
schemes) were abolished. However, the rapprochement was not complete in the sense that no reparations were made to members of R2,
and therefore the postrapprochement era begins with R1 s uniformly
having more wealth than R2 s. Two hundred years later, there are no
longer any attitudes, behaviors, or beliefs, among either R1 s or R2 s,
which we would ordinarily identify as racist. However, there also is
no change in mortgage policies, which ensures that more, and more
beneficial, mortgages go to those with better credit ratings, and better
credit ratings are assigned to those with greater assets. As a direct
result of this state of affairs, R2 s still have fewer good homes, less
wealth, and a weaker sense of economic security than R1 s have.
The institutional forces at work in Real Estate can apparently be
legitimately described as racist: because the two races do not start, even
after the rapprochement, at just relative starting points, and because
the relevant credit institutions perpetuate existing inequality, those institutions perpetuate (indeed, exacerbate) a socioeconomic structure in
which members of R1 systematically and unjustly have greater access to
housing, to a comparatively accessible vehicle for growing personal
wealth, and not least to a source of perceived security and well-being
than do members of R2. Thus, while, by hypothesis, the mortgage industry has policies that are, other things being equal, just, other things
are not equal, because of the society’s racist past. Further, imagine that
everyone is well aware of the problem and wants to fix it, and at the
moment they are just waiting to vote in a referendum that will select
policies aimed at solving the problem, perhaps to determine the exact
monetary amount that should be paid to each R2 in order for their
society to have a racially just economic distribution. So, despite the fact
that no one agent is racist at this moment, a troubled past means that
their otherwise just institutions perpetuate an unjust racial inequity. This
seems to qualify those institutions as racist.29
Reductionism thus counterintuitively implies that it is conceptually
impossible to have a society whose members are wholly committed to
eliminating their racist institutions, for if all of the agents are antiracists,
then reductionism means that the institutions that are served by those
29. My data point here is that we frequently do refer to these kinds of social structures
as racist. (Perhaps in this respect ‘racism’ has come to cover some of what used to be called
‘racial injustice’ but not ‘racism’.) The discussion in the text is partly meant to speak to
readers who don’t have a firm intuition that the institutions in Real Estate really are racist.
However, my account of institutional racism will not resonate with readers who firmly believe
that those institutions are definitely not racist. For example, Dinesh D’Souza simply insists
that institutional racism is a “nonsense phrase” (The End of Racism, 336). For an argument
that D’Souza’s understanding of institutional racism is not compelling, see Garcia, “Philosophical Analysis,” 5–6.
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agents are not racist. Put slightly differently, the claim that institutions
are racist at a given time only if some participants in the institutions
are racist at that time would implausibly mean that the institutions are
racist only until the last racist person dies off, at which point, despite
there not being any change to their structure or to their effects on real
lives, those institutions magically convert to being nonracist.
Now some might plausibly insist that, while these considerations
show that none of the present members need to have attitudes or beliefs
that are responsible for this society’s racist institutions, institutions like
those in Real Estate must always have been generated or sustained by
some person’s racist attitudes, behaviors, or beliefs at some time in order
to be fairly called ‘racist’. Garcia suggests this kind of genetic response,
although it appears to be distinct from his insistence that “if [an institution] does not operate from [racist] motives (at time T1), then it does
not embody institutional racism (at T1).” Reductionism is a time-slice
thesis, which holds that for every institution at every moment it is racist,
its racism is based in the racism of some agent at that moment; the
genetic thesis is a historical thesis, which holds that for every institution
at every moment it is racist, its racism at least partly originated in the
racism of some agent at some point up to the moment at which the
institution is racist.30
I find the genetic thesis plausible. Imagine a society just like the
30. Garcia, “Current Conceptions,” 27, and “Heart of Racism,” 424–25. At another point,
Garcia calls lingering, post-agential institutional racism “rather marginal and insignificant”
(“Philosophical Analysis,” 17). Views that seem to suggest a commitment to reductionism
but that might be interpreted as committing instead to the genetic thesis include Kurt Baier,
“Merit and Race,” Philosophia 8 (1978): 121–51, 129; Corlett, Race, 69–70; and Shelby, “Is
Racism in the ‘Heart’?” 416. See also Blum,“I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ,” 22–26, and “Systemic
and Individual Racism.” To clarify, the most plausible version of the genetic thesis will allow
that the racist institution might have been either originally created under the umbrella of
agential racism or created originally in a nonracist manner but later sustained in some
agentially racist manner. Thus, to falsify the genetic thesis, there must be some case where
no agential racism has “infected” the racist institution at any point in its history, but which
remains racist nevertheless.
A very different kind of agent-based view holds that talk of institutional racism can
be understood as personifying institutions, in the way that, say, corporations are sometimes
legally treated as persons. According to Arthur, when asking whether some institution is
racist, we are “asking whether if we were to assume that an action taken by an institution had
been performed instead by a single person, would that person [in his attitudes] be racist ?” (Race,
Equality, and the Burdens of History, 33). The particular shortcoming of this approach is
that, while personification might be a useful heuristic, it does no explanatory work in
accounting for the actual wrongness of actual institutional, rather than agential, racism.
It can say why institutional arrangements would be racist, and would be wrong, were they
arranged by an agent, but not why they are racist, and are wrong, when not arranged by
agents. Furthermore, since people can produce any given outcome with a number of
different attitudes, it is also, I think, difficult to speculate on what attitude would have
motivated an institution were it a person instead of an institution.
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society in Real Estate, but where the relevant institutions arose out of
unintentional mismanagement, perhaps even by mismanagement on the
part of R2s themselves. Call this version of the case Unintentional Real
Estate. Fans of the genetic thesis insist that we should not call institutions
like those in Unintentional Real Estate ‘racist’. Dummett, for example,
writes that “indirect discrimination may occur when some rule unintentionally disadvantages members of some racial group; plainly, when
this has happened by accident, it is due to thoughtlessness rather than
racism.” And Garcia holds that (1) harm caused unintentionally is morally condemnable only if it springs from “vices” like “carelessness, negligence, or recklessness” for which we can be held responsible, in which
case, if we believe (as both he and I do) that (2) racism is always morally
condemnable, this suggests that (3) harm from an unintentionally structured institution that is not caused carelessly, negligently, or recklessly
should never be called ‘racist’.31
One way to save Garcia’s intuitive (if not uncontroversial) 1 and 2
without having to accept 3 is to construe ‘morally condemnable’ differently in 1 and 2. Assertion 1 is at its most plausible if ‘condemnable’
is construed narrowly to mean something like ‘condemnable as a wrong
action’. However, institutions and social structures might be condemnable in a broader sense that doesn’t presuppose agential culpability.
Consider, for example,
Accident. At time t, a society is arranged such that one person has
almost all of the wealth and power, while the other million people
live in dire poverty with no power. This distribution fails to maximize
utility or real freedom, was not arrived at through free transfers,
can be reasonably rejected by just about everyone, and fails to conform to principles that would be chosen from a fair initial position.
(In short, the distribution fails to satisfy any remotely plausible
theory of distributive justice.) It arose when a freak accident killed
off everyone except those trapped in a mine plus its one bunkerprotected media baron, who alone can open the mine. The media
baron has no way of knowing that the accident spared but trapped
those in the mine, so he does not know that he has all the power.
Some might judge that such a distribution is unjust at t even though
it was generated and sustained unintentionally. Even if some substantive
31. Dummett, “The Nature of Racism,” 30; Garcia, “Racism and Racial Discourse,” 132;
cf. Garcia, “Current Conceptions,” 24. At one point, Garcia writes: “I see no future for an
account of oppression in which there are no agents of the oppression, for oppression is not
something that merely exists or happens, but is done and therefore done by some agents”
(“Three Sites,” 39 n. 2; cf. Garcia, “Racism as a Model,” 48). Paul Taylor puts a slightly
different spin on this line by identifying institutions as racist when stakeholders in those
institutions are confronted with evidence of “asymmetric operations” but won’t do anything
to correct them (Race, 35).
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theory of distributive justice entailed that this distribution were just,
there seems to be no conceptual mistake in making such a judgment.
This clears the path to consistency for those who want to say that racist
institutions are morally condemnable (preserving 2), that (∼3) they can
arise unintentionally, and that (1) agential harm is wrong only if done
intentionally, negligently, carelessly, or recklessly: we might want to say
that such institutions are, though not the product of culpable and wrong
actions, at least unjust. Since the moral scope of racism covers not only
individual ethics but also social justice, there is room to say that institutions can be unjustly racist without tracing to any specific agent’s
morally wrong action.
Thus, there may be plausible ways to reject the genetic thesis. However, I don’t want to reject it; I suspect that in Accident there is badness
but not injustice (unless and until the media baron knowingly perpetuates the distribution). Nevertheless, even if the genetic thesis is correct,
that is, even if rightly calling institutions ‘unjust’ or ‘racist’ is contingent
on their having come about or being sustained in such-and-such a manner, we still have reason to deny that the injustice or racism themselves
consist in the beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors of the individuals who once
generated or sustained such institutions. Most directly, those who are
otherwise engaged in a dispute over whether racism is subject to the
genetic constraint can come to an independent agreement on what cases
to recognize as cases of racism: they can agree that the racism is not
necessarily found in the agents themselves. And, most fundamentally,
it is plausible that what makes the present state of affairs in Real Estate
objectionable is not that long-dead generations had racist attitudes that
led to it but that it itself is racist. We don’t look at a society like that in
Real Estate and object that the ancestors who set things in motion were
racist but that it is, at present, perpetuating unjust racial inequality.32
Thus it seems that institutional racism can be present at t without any
agents who interact with the institution at t being responsible for that
racism. Contrary to reductionism, institutional racism seems capable of
outliving agential racism.
Just as reductive agent-based accounts fail to adequately accommodate the phenomenon of pure institutional racism, theories that
understand all racism as institutional are, as others have decisively argued, also doomed, precisely because they commit the opposite error:
32. Haslanger, “Oppressions,” 105. Indeed, even if all the racists are gone, institutions
can perpetuate economic inequality in a way that revives the myth that different races are
not equal in ability to create wealth, a myth by which people might newly become racist. So
institutional racism can foster agent-based racism. See Tommie Shelby, We Who Are Dark: The
Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2005), 156–57. Thanks
to Paul Hurley for discussion here.
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they cannot handle cases of purely agential racism. Someone who desired a racial hierarchy but lived in, and couldn’t help but perpetuate,
a racially egalitarian society should be considered racist (or at least the
desire should), as should the powerless person who cannot find a way
to institutionalize her bigotry.33
To return to the larger picture, then, our first desideratum is not
only to account for multiple forms of agent-based racism but also to
analyze racism in a way that encompasses institutional forms of racism.
This is to confront the location problem writ large. Neither agent-based
nor institution-based reductive analyses can do the trick.
The location problem results from failing to adequately grapple
with what Blum calls the “categorial plurality” of racial phenomena:
many categories of entity—beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, agents, institutions, and so forth—can be irreducibly racist.34 Finding a way to deal
with this plurality has been the primary focus in the literature. Garcia
highlights the attitudes of ill will and disregard, Dummett makes prejudice the key to his attitudinal/behaviorist account, Shelby’s cognitivist account features ideologies about racial superiority and essentialism that function to rationalize oppression, and so on. Each taps
into compelling intuitions about the nature of racism, but by focusing
only on a proper subset of racism’s categorial plurality, each not only
fails, as we have seen, to accommodate all of racism’s categorial plurality but also, therefore, to find a property (or properties) that is (or
are) necessary and sufficient, or (if we resort to a cluster analysis) an
exhaustive set of properties that are each individually sufficient but
not necessary, for racism. Thus a task that has not yet been accomplished, our second desideratum, is to make sure we can find such a
property or properties. It might seem that these first two objectives
are just the same objective described differently. As we will see in
Section II, however, this is not the case, and separating them will be
an important part of meeting the first objective.
C. Racism’s Moral Status
I believe that an adequate understanding of racism must meet one final
objective: it must accommodate the judgment that ‘racism’ is, inter alia,
a term of moral disapprobation. In this regard, I follow others, such as
Blum, Garcia, and Philips, in holding that racism is always at least de33. Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ,” 9–10; “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” 62–63;
Garcia, “Current Conceptions,” 11–13, “Racism as a Model,” 47, and “Three Sites,” 39; Haslanger, “Oppressions.”
34. Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” 72.
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feasibly morally condemnable.35 Shelby and Mills think that racism
should be defined in a nonmoral manner, and only after such a definition has been laid out should we independently identify its moral
status.36 One case that might be marshaled against the conceptual tethering of immorality and racism is the proud racist, who considers himself
an upstanding person, of firm moral conviction, and who, believing that
his race is superior to all others, seeks to entrench members of his race
in positions of power. He not only happily embraces his racism; he
additionally believes it to be morally justified. And, all the same, he
identifies himself and his goals as racist. If it is true that racism is morally
wrong by definition, then he is not only mistaken but actually incoherent
to claim both that his supremacist goals are racist and that they are not
wrong. So saying that such a person is conceptually confused is one
bullet that I must bite. If I’m going to bite this bullet, I must at least
explain where such a person makes his error, and the explanation must
be that he mistakenly thinks either that he is a racist or that he is not
morally corrupt. I opt for the latter: he is incorrect to think that he is
not morally corrupt.
Arthur’s main rationale for conceiving of racism’s normative status
in terms of its lacking an epistemic or rational justification, rather than
its being immoral, seems to be that we can imagine a “reluctant racist”
who despises his own racism, deeply regrets his racist upbringing, and
undertakes a rigorous therapy program to eliminate his racism, but who,
for all that, cannot avoid feeling racist hostility. Arthur thinks we should
not judge such a person morally blameworthy and instead should simply
say that the reluctant racist persists in epistemic error.37
However, as ordinarily used, the term ‘racist’ seems to carry moral
weight even in this context. To be sure, this usage may require us to
35. Can the wrongness of an instance of racism sometimes be defeated? Perhaps. If a
very powerful alien reliably told you that he would kill all Rs unless you daily refer to all Rs
only by using a racist slur, or unless you successfully internalize an attitude of hatred toward
Rs, perhaps it would be obligatory, all things considered, to perform such racist speech acts
or to cultivate such an attitude. Garcia holds that “racism is immoral, not just presumptively
but conclusively” (“Current Conceptions,” 12). If presumptive immorality maps onto defeasible wrongness, and if conclusive immorality maps onto all-things-considered wrongness,
then cases like this one suggest that it overstates the immorality of racism to say that it is
always conclusively immoral. To say, however, that an obligation to avoid racism might be
overridden in some contexts is not to deny that all racist acts retain traces of wrongness.
Accepting the latter proposition would only require adopting (at least a local kind of) moral
generalism.
36. Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?” 411–13; Mills, “‘Heart’ Attack,” 58. Shelby emphasizes that we should understand “the history, structure, psychological mechanisms, and
social consequences” of racism, but this goal is compatible with racism being analyzed in
such a way that it ends up always being (at least defeasibly) morally askew.
37. Arthur, Race, Equality, and the Burdens of History, 17–22.
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stake out some controversial positions about moral assessment, but I
don’t believe that it commits us to any position that is downright implausible. We might say, first, that the reluctant racist is still responsible
for his hostility, despite his reluctance. Obviously, it is no easy task to
sort out exactly when we are responsible for our attitudes, but on at
least some theories of responsibility for attitudes, the reluctant racist
might be responsible for his attitudes and, as such, morally condemnable
for holding them.38 Now some might insist that we can construct a case
of a deeply unwilling racist who is, on influential theories of responsibility, not responsible for the hostility he feels, perhaps because in being
so unwilling, the racist has become so alienated or disassociated from
his hostility that it is “external” to him.39 So, as a second tack, we might
follow those, such as Justin Oakley, who hold that there are some moral
assessments, “aretaic” assessments on Oakley’s parsing, that target objects for which the agent need not be responsible.40 Think of what the
unwilling or alienated kleptomaniac might say: “I know my continual
thievery is wrong, but I can’t resist the temptation, a temptation that I
hate and thoroughly reject.” Using ‘wrong’ in this way might presuppose
a controversial position, but the mere fact that it can be used in this
way also suggests that, at least as a conceptual matter, it is not implausible
to believe that moral assessment can cover repudiated and disassociated
attitudes, even if the agent is not responsible for those attitudes. This
is not to deny, of course, that the proud or willing racist is condemnable
in a way that the unwilling racist is not.
Again, both of these positions are sure to be controversial. But
since this is not the occasion to defend a theory of responsibility or
assessment, and since ordinary usage of ‘racist’ seems to presuppose
that racism is wrong (regardless of whatever the true theory of responsibility and assessment might be), I am going to proceed on the
assumption that something in their neighborhood is defensible. Indeed, it is because of the prevalence of this presupposition in ordinary
discourse that I take a third desideratum for any theory of racism to
be that it should capture racism’s moral condemnability. The account
I present below is meant to satisfy this constraint. If the end-of-theday, true theories of moral responsibility and assessment turn out to
38. For a recent discussion of responsibility for attitudes, see Angela M. Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2005): 236–71.
39. See, for prominent example, the work of Harry Frankfurt, e.g., “Identification and
Externality,” in his The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 58–68. In this way, Arthur is on to something notable here that I do not wish
to deny: the desperately unwilling racist is irrational insofar as the hostility he harbors fails
to comport with his deeper judgments. On this kind of irrationality, see Smith, “Responsibility
for Attitudes,” 253.
40. Justin Oakley, Morality and the Emotions (London: Routledge, 1992), chap. 5.
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be incompatible with this constraint, then what follows below would
have to be modified accordingly. To be clear, though, it is not the
third constraint, or views like mine that comply with it, that are the
problem here, if there is indeed a problem. The problem would be
that ordinary usage would (by hypothesis) endorse a triad of inconsistent propositions: that racism is always morally condemnable, that
agents are always responsible for what is morally condemnable, and
that agents are not always responsible for their racist attitudes. Since
our primary concern here is to articulate an account of racism in a
way that preserves ordinary usage of the term ‘racism’, we should
sacrifice, if only provisionally, the second or third proposition in order
to preserve the first. So I will proceed on the premise that we should
try to find an account of racism that can make sense of its apparent
moral inadequacy.
What we have seen so far, then, is the following. First, none of the
rival accounts considered above can accommodate all cases that seem
intuitively to be classified as racist. Thus we still need an analysis that
can make sense of the wide range of cases of racism; that is, we still
need to solve the location problem. Second, our analysis should find a
set of properties (perhaps a disjunction of properties) that specifies
necessary and sufficient conditions for racism. Finally, that analysis
should somehow make sense of the judgment that racism is morally
problematic. With these objectives in mind, I next want to propose a
new account of racism.
II. THE DISRESPECT ANALYSIS
The accounts considered above all deal with the location problem by
specifying a proper subset of commonly recognized locations of racism
(attitudes, behaviors, etc.) fundamental to racism, and in so doing they
exclude from the domain of racism cases that occupy other locations
but that are, it seems, intuitively classified as cases of racism. As was
noted at the outset, some might argue that such exclusions are simply
unavoidable, but I maintain that sacrificing the intuitive in any case
counts as an analytical cost. And I now want to argue that it is a cost
that can be plausibly avoided.
If an adequate monistic analysis of racism does not require one
fundamental location for racism, then adopting a noncommittal stance
about what categories can and can’t be racist—a stance of location
neutrality—would solve the location problem in one easy step. What
makes an analysis of f monistic is that it gives a feature or conjunction
of features, G, that is distinctive and common to all F s, whether or
not F-ness can be found in a variety of locations. If everything that is
funny is funny because it is G, we can give a monistic account of funny
by saying that J is funny just in case J is G, even if lots of things—jokes,
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facial expressions, situations—can be G. Whether any monistic analysis
of racism succeeds will thus depend not on whether we can find one
location as the sole fundamental site of racism but on whether the G
privileged in the analysans really is found in all and only instances of
racism. Not specifying any location, then, seems like the right way to
handle the location problem without abandoning the search for a unified account of racism. The widespread attempt to satisfy the first desideratum by finding a single location for racism has, I think, masked
the real task, that of satisfying the second desideratum, coming up with
an acceptable G. If we can do this in a location-neutral way, then we
can satisfy the first desideratum for free.
A promising step in this direction is to analyze racism in terms of
disrespectfulness. Of course, many instances of disrespect have nothing
to do with racism. The kind of disrespect with which we are concerned
must be racially relevant in some way. So we might say that J is racist
if and only if J is racially disrespectful. Since ‘racially disrespectful’ is
not the most transparent locution, when being precise I’ll instead adopt
the following clumsier formula, which I will call the Disrespect Analysis
of racism:
(DA) J is racist if and only if J is disrespectful toward members of
racialized group R as R s.
A few remarks on DA are in order. First, why say that racism targets
one’s racialized group rather than one’s race? Racialized groups are,
roughly, groups of people who have been identified and treated as if
they were members of the same race. One virtue of identifying racialized
groups (and their members) as the targets of racism is that it allows us
to avoid taking a stand on whether race is real; DA is neutral between
realist and antirealist views of race. While many deny that race is real,
few deny that racialized groups are real. So we can, at little cost, avoid
taking on a very cumbersome piece of theoretical baggage by identifying
racialized groups rather than races as the targets of racism.41 Another
virtue is that, even if race does turn out to be real, people might very
41. Many accounts of racism that otherwise depart from DA could adopt the same kind
of agnosticism about the ontology of race, and some, such as Blum’s, Garcia’s, and Haslanger’s, in fact do. To sort out what it is to see a group of people as a race (i.e., what it is
for a group of people to be racialized), we need to know what the concept of race consists
in. My own view is that races are supposed to be groups of humans demarcated by certain
visible traits in biologically nonarbitrary ways, but defending this or any other analysis of the
concept of race is a complicated and contentious matter. One view about the reality of race
is just that race is made real, as a social kind, by a history of racist practices and discourses.
I think that this view is false, but if I am wrong and it turns out to be true, then races and
racialized groups may be coextensive. (For extended treatment of these issues, see Joshua
Glasgow, A Theory of Race [New York: Routledge, 2009].)
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well have mistaken beliefs about race, and their racism might be responsive to their mistaken beliefs. Suppose for the sake of argument
that the end-of-the-day ontological truth about race is that race is real
but that Jews do not constitute a race. Of course, at the same time, some
people have believed that Jewish people constitute a race and have
harbored attitudes toward Jews that we would ordinarily call ‘racist’.
Although these attitudes are premised on a belief about the nature of
race that we are supposing is mistaken, they appear no less racist for
their mistake. Plausibly, this is because racism can be responsive to a
subjective dimension of mental life and target groups that, perhaps
mistakenly, we take to be races. Allowing for this subjective dimension
handily enables us to say that, even if Jews are not a race, it is conceptually possible for the anti-Semite to be racist. In these ways, it makes
sense to identify the targets of racism as racialized groups rather than
races.
Turn now to the second, and for our purposes most important,
strength of DA: it can accommodate the variety of agential and institutional racism, thus avoiding the location problem and providing a
plausible analysans for racism. Before expanding on this claim, it is
worth noting that even the categorial plurality covered in Section I is
not exhaustive. For example, Blum’s list of racism’s many locations includes “beliefs, practices, institutions, utterances, propositions, actions,
feelings, attitudes, societies, and more.”42 Faced with such a daunting
array of racisms, Blum has expressed concern that no single account
can accommodate the plurality of racist phenomena. I think this is too
pessimistic, as DA can account for (almost?) all widely recognized forms
of racism, in which case DA will at least prove more fitting than the
alternative proposals considered in the previous section, as none of them
could accommodate all of those forms of racism.43
Recall, in particular, Garcia’s view. For Garcia, disrespect is just one
kind of disregard, and racism includes not only disregard more generally
but also ill will. As we have seen, the problem with attitudinal accounts
like Garcia’s is that they cannot accommodate nonattitudinal racist beliefs or behaviors. So since disregard is ineluctably attitudinal, if we
follow Garcia in understanding disrespect as one species of disregard,
DA will be no broader than Garcia’s volitional conception. Importantly,
however, we should not feel compelled to understand disrespect in that
attitudinal way, for disrespect can be predicated of many different cat42. Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?” 72.
43. The claim that all racist phenomena can be accommodated by one analysis of racism
does not deny that there are some racial ills that are not forms of racism, as Blum has also
taken care to establish. This point will be further discussed in Sec. III below.
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egories—indeed, if DA is right, it can be at least as location neutral as
racism is.44
Perhaps most obviously, disrespect can be predicated of the three
main agential categories we are considering: attitudes, beliefs (and the
statements that express them), and behaviors. We say things like: “Your
dismissive attitude is disrespectful,” “Your claim that Kerry is a coward
is disrespectful, particularly in light of his exemplary military service,”
and “Giving him ‘the finger’ was disrespectful.” Indeed, we say such
things even when the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors seem to come
apart from each other. We might tell a child who “gives someone the
finger” just because that’s what he saw his older brother do to stop
doing that on the grounds that it is disrespectful, even though the child
had no disrespect in his heart. Thus it appears that not all behavioral
or cognitive disrespect derives from attitudinal disrespect.
We say similar things when the subject is race: “Your fear of all Rs
does not respect their individual differences,” “Your belief that Rs are
uniquely unintelligent shows an incredible amount of disrespect,” and
“Discriminating against Rs in hiring does not give them the respect they
are due.” Thus, while Garcia confines the language of disregard and ill
will to attitudes, the language of disrespect can be extended beyond
that to beliefs and behaviors as well. Here again, this extension includes
beliefs and behaviors that do not necessarily express any attitude of
disregard or ill will, such as the benevolent but ignorant person who
believes that R s are unintelligent or who due to unconscious bias discriminates in hiring.
Furthermore, the language of respect—unlike all ineluctably agentbased language—can be extended to institutions. For example, whatever
one’s stance on the morality of abortion, prochoice advocates hardly
seem to betray conceptual confusion when they assert that antiabortion
laws fail to respect a woman’s right to choose her conditions of pregnancy. And, again, the language of respect seems appropriate when
thinking about institutional racism. Antimiscegenation laws failed to
respect rights of intimacy and love and the people whose rights were
at stake. The political, legal, and military institutions in the United States
that collectively enabled the near extermination of multiple indigenous
44. See Taylor, Race, 32–38, for a “deattitudinalized” account of disregard. The “overattitudinalization” of disrespect seems to have created some unnecessary image problems
for respect-based accounts. For example, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, in “The Badness of
Discrimination,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2006): 167–85, 180–84, rejects respectbased accounts of discrimination (rather than racism) because he thinks they entail that
discrimination can be bad only when someone is “actually being disrespectful” and that the
only way out of this problematic entailment is to have the discriminator falsely represent the
discriminatee as having a lower moral status. As I will argue, we need not take DA down
either of these paths.
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American peoples disrespected them on several fronts, not least as members of sovereign nations and as persons with a moral standing that
entails rights of life and security (among other things). And the institutions that conspire to systematically discriminate socioeconomically
against R2 s in Real Estate fail to respect their equal moral and political
standing. Thus it seems that DA’s language of disrespect is fitting with
regard to both institutional racism and the varieties of agential racism.
Next, recall that Blum’s list of categories includes societies and
people as capable of being racist, which surely makes sense: some people—not merely their attitudes or beliefs, but the people themselves—
are racist, and some societies, such as the United States at times—plausibly including all times to date—are racist. Accordingly, the language
of disrespect had better work in these cases too. And so it does. We can
say to the racist, “You—not merely your beliefs or attitudes, but you—
fail to respect the targets of your hatred.” Similarly, we can say that the
United States has shown a monumental lack of respect for just about
every single racialized group other than white people. Perhaps this way
of talking about societal racism is reducible: perhaps what we really
mean is that the people in charge, or particular institutions at work, or
both, have shown a monumental lack of respect. But it does not matter,
for the purposes of evaluating DA, whether such a reduction is appropriate, for DA accommodates the kinds of racism under consideration
now so long as disrespect can be predicated of both people and societies.
In addition, Blum holds that the propositional content of the statement “Arabs are all terrorists who are attempting to destroy our way of
life” is racist—not merely that the utterance or endorsement of this statement is racist but that the proposition is racist as well. He also holds that
the swastika is a racist symbol.45 I find it hard to settle on a firm intuition
about whether these are truly cases of racism. To be sure, endorsing the
statement “All Arabs are terrorists” appears racist, but what’s racist here
is arguably not the proposition but the mental state of the endorser. So
it’s less than perfectly clear that the objects of our propositional attitudes
can be independently racist and, as Shelby points out, how they can be
immoral.46 The same seems true of symbols. Thus it appears that racism
might be contained not in the swastika or the proposition per se but in
the wearing or displaying of the swastika and the asserting of the proposition. Note, though, that DA is helpfully uncommitted on this question.
Given that symbols and propositions might have moralized meaning,
which can be expressed in our attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, DA can
45. Blum,“I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ,” 16, 18–22, and “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’
Do?” 72.
46. Tommie Shelby, “Racism, Morality, and Social Criticism” (unpublished manuscript,
Harvard University).
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locate the racial disrespect either in the symbols or propositions themselves or in the expression of their meaning.
To this point I hope to have shown that DA can accommodate a
range of cases that is broader than the ranges covered by the rival
analyses considered in Section I; to that extent it is more successful at
accommodating ordinary discourse. This flexibility notwithstanding,
however, in the next section I will indicate some points at which DA
requires taking some stands that some might find controversial. Before
getting to that, though, two more fundamental issues must be addressed.
First, what notion of respect am I working with, and is it itself unified?
Second, what does it mean for something to be racially disrespectful?
Let’s take these one at a time.
Putting race aside, I have left open what does and does not count
as disrespectful. While I will say something about that question momentarily, respect is, of course, a much discussed, normatively loaded
notion, and this is not the place to give a full theory of it. Instead, I
hope that most readers, whatever their theoretical persuasions, have
some sort of pretheoretical grip on respect and can agree on a series
of commonly recognized cases of disrespectfulness: systematic suppression of Rs’ political rights, workplace discrimination against Rs, the
utterance of racial epithets, hating Rs as Rs, and so on. Presumably
disagreement will arise regarding whether or not some other cases (such
as affirmative action) are properly categorized as respectful. Rather than
sort out exactly what is and what is not respectful—a task that, obviously,
exceeds this article—all DA suggests is that J is racist when and only
when it is racially disrespectful. Whatever the true story is about what
does and what does not constitute disrespect will also constrain what is
and what is not racist. But while this agnosticism about the general
nature of respect is tolerable for our purposes, it is tolerable only up
to a point. For, if it turns out that respect is not itself unified, then
two potential landmines might lie in DA’s path.47
The first potential problem is that the disunity of respect might
itself threaten the unity of any analysis for which respect is an analysans.
It is safe to suppose that there is a rich array of kinds of disrespect that
can manifest themselves racially, but two points can mitigate the concern
that this diversity destabilizes the relevant unity of racism. First, despite
this diversity, all instances of disrespect may still have something in
common. Although I don’t want DA’s fate to rest on this understanding
of disrespect, I am partial to understanding the relevant kind of disrespect as something like a failure to adequately recognize autonomous,
independent, sensitive, morally significant creatures. I won’t present a
47. I am grateful to Sally Haslanger, Edouard Machery, and Jay Wallace for pressing
me to address this issue.
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sustained examination of respect here, so the jury is out on this understanding. But I suspect that something in its neighborhood could
be common to both agential and institutional forms of racism.
Christopher Heath Wellman recently suggested an instructive example in another context.48 Just as a parent of one white child and one
black child would disrespect the black child to announce that he doesn’t
want to have a third child for fear that she might be black, so a state
can disrespect its nonwhite citizens by exclusively banning nonwhite
immigrants from entry. Just as an utterance can express disrespect, so
can a policy, and the disrespect expressed by the agent or the institution
might have a common core. The expressive work done by our institutions is in fact one of their more powerful functions. Our institutions
partly determine not only who will be physically harmed or imprisoned
or financially benefitted but also which creatures will be accorded what
kinds and levels of political status. And in so doing, those institutions
are subject to evaluation in terms of respectfulness. A small business
manager fails to adequately respect Rs when he discriminates against
them in hiring no more than institutions disrespect R s when they unequally constrain their rights. And, as we saw above, institutionalized
disrespect can outlive the agential disrespect from which it was spawned.
We see this phenomenon not only in cases like Real Estate but also in
antimiscegenation laws that remained on the books in some U.S. states
after they had been ruled unconstitutional in 1967: even though these
laws were now unenforceable, citizens of the states that had them eventually sought to remove them anyway, because of their embarrassing
expressive content. (The last U.S. state to repeal such a law was Alabama,
in 2000. Even then, some 40 percent voted to keep the law, itself a
disrespectful, if legally inconsequential, expressive act.) To return to the
bigger issue, then, though this exploration of disrespect hardly constitutes a decisive argument or analysis, it does suggest that we might be
able to understand disrespect in a single way that is broad enough to
capture talk of both institutions and agents and that is relevant to racism,
for it may in all of these cases involve a failure of recognition.49
48. Christopher Heath Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of Association,” Ethics 119
(2008): 109–41, 139–40.
49. This understanding of respect is thus a modified form of what many, following
Stephen Darwall, call “recognition respect” (Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88
[1977]: 36–49). One modification is to add that, at least sometimes, the appropriate
recognition will involve valuing the object of respect, when the object is a person. Thus
the respect in question is what Robin S. Dillon calls valuing recognition respect (in
“Respect,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2007, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/respect/). Another modification pertains to the deliberative
focus of Darwall’s analysis. As he understands it, the core component of recognition
respect is “giving appropriate consideration or recognition to some feature of its object
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Additionally, there is a second, more direct, and arguably more
conclusive response to the first concern about the unity of respect: we
can deny the supposition that disunity in a concept contained in the
analysans compromises the unity of the analysis. If it turns out, for
comparison, that man is a cluster concept, this would not mean that we
fail to give bachelor a unified analysis when we analyze it as unmarried
man. Suppose that some men are men because of their reproductive
organs, while others are men because of their genetic codes, and the
two populations are not coextensive. In that case of conceptual disunity
in man, I think we should still want to say that, nevertheless, to analyze
bachelor in terms of unmarried man is to give a unified analysis of
bachelor. (We should say the same thing if a person can be unmarried
in the sense relevant for bachelorhood either by not having undergone
the right kind of legal ritual or by not having undergone the right kind
of religious ritual.) The same is true, I want to say, of racism. Even if
respect turns out to be a nonunified concept, analyzing racism as
racial disrespect will itself still be a unified analysis.
But even if this counts as a unified analysis, a second related worry
on the disunity front is that, if respect is not unified, then we might
lose an important normative resource in our analysis. For example,
consider that those who are reluctant to grant the existence of institutional racism might be persuaded by being shown that institutional
racism has something wrong in common with agential racism.50 If institutional racism features a kind of disrespect that is fundamentally
different from agential respect, then do we lose that kind of persuasive
in deliberating about what to do” (Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” 38). Recognition
respect can be given by both institutions and individuals if we remove the practical
deliberation requirement. Even putting institutional respect to the side, it is arguable
that these words should be removed anyway, since our attitudes seem capable of manifesting valuing recognition respect or disrespect whether or not they figure in our
deliberations. And bringing institutions back in, it seems fair to say that both institutions
and agents can engage in valuing recognition respect. Even if they have no attitudes,
institutions and their policies can (and should) reflect our equal moral status. Those
who are uncertain whether institutions can really be respectful or disrespectful might
recall that if we accept the genetic thesis, institutions will be disrespectful only if they
originated in the disrespectfulness of agents.
Note that claiming that both people and institutions can express disrespect does not
by itself commit one to an expressive theory of rational action, such as that proposed by
Elizabeth Anderson in Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993). That is, even a consequentialist theory of rational action can claim that
expressing disrespect can bring about disvalue and thereby fail to be rational. Thus my
account appears to be in principle compatible with any theory of rational action (which
should be an appealing feature even for those who, like me, are sympathetic to Anderson’s
theory). That said, Anderson does argue that expressive considerations cannot be coherently captured by consequentialism (see esp. 80–81).
50. I am grateful to Jay Wallace for supplying this consideration.
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argument by normative analogy? To stave off this worry, we can again
note that our agnosticism leaves it open that all instances of disrespect
might plausibly have something substantive in common. Beyond that,
though, the second worry can also be alleviated if all instances of disrespect have something less substantive but more formal, and also morally weighty, in common. That is, if ‘disrespect’ itself connotes a moral
negative (as I believe it does), then even if all instances of disrespect
have nothing else in common besides that moral valence, they will all
be at least defeasibly morally condemnable, and in that case DA can
enable the normative work we want done by an analysis of racism.51
Thus, I think that I am here working with an understanding of
respect that is vague but tolerably so. Our last analytical task, then, is
to unpack what it means for J to be racially disrespectful, that is, to be
disrespectful toward members of R as Rs. As Haslanger points out, racial
injustice is not coextensive with disproportionally affecting one racial
group rather than another. “For example, a Japanese company with all
Japanese workers might exploit those workers, but this would not make
the exploitation a racial injustice.”52 So in order for J to be racially
disrespectful, it must disrespect people as members of their racialized
group: the Japanese workers are disrespected as workers, not as members
of any R. (This should not be read as denying that racism can intersect
in a variety of ways with classism and other forms of oppression.) Thus,
for J to be racist, it must disrespect members of some racialized group
as members of that group. Put otherwise, the identity of the victim’s
racialized group must play a suitably explanatory role in characterizing
disrespect that is uniquely racist.53 That is to say, if we can adequately
explain the disrespect without mentioning the racialized identity of the
target(s) of J, then J won’t be racist. We don’t need to refer to the
Japanese workers’ racialized identity to explain their bosses’ exploitative
behavior; we do need to refer to black people’s racialized identity in
order to explain the uniquely racist disrespectfulness of the lynchings
with which whites terrorized blacks in the period between reconstruction
and the civil rights era in the United States.
51. As this suggests, I am partial to interpreting not only racism but also disrespect
such that it is always (at least defeasibly) wrong. Thus I do not think that, other things
equal, it would ever be right to engage in racial disrespect, even directed by the racially
oppressed at the racially oppressive. This doesn’t mean that act-types that are typically
disrespectful—condemnation, imprisonment, punitive reparation—would not be called
for in reaction to racial oppression. It just means that in such cases tokens of those acttypes would not count as disrespectful.
52. Haslanger, “Oppressions,” 108–9. Cf. Garcia, “Current Conceptions,” 23; and
Shelby, “Is Racism in the ‘Heart’?” 414.
53. Arthur, Race, Equality, and the Burdens of History, 15; Lippert-Rasmussen, “Badness,”
170. Cf. Haslanger, “Oppressions.”

Glasgow

Racism as Disrespect

89

That said, the explanatory role of the racialized identity need not
pertain to any qualities of the racialized group that the racist perceives
as essential to that group. A racist might, of course, be disrespectful toward
a racialized group because he perceives it as somehow inherently deserving of disrespect or as possessing essential traits that somehow warrant
disrespect. But the racist also might be disrespectful toward Rs just because
he thinks that Rs are (as a contingent matter, prone to being) cheap and
he thinks cheapness warrants his being disrespectful.54 On DA, this still
counts as racist, since Rs are being disrespected as Rs by this racist. That
is, it is not a case where Rs coincidentally happen to disproportionally
figure in his disrespect toward cheap people. Rather it is one in which
they, as Rs, are singled out for disrespect because they are perceived to
be (essentially or not) cheap. This counts as a case, therefore, of racism.
III. POINTS OF CONTENTION
This account is flexible enough to accommodate multiple aspects of racism. Most importantly, DA is consistent with the many apparent locations
of racism. Also recall that there is some dispute over whether one must
be in a position of power to be racist. I side with those (including Blum,
Garcia, and Taylor) who reject this idea—I believe that white racism is
not the only kind of racism in societies with a history of predominantly
white racism. But DA itself has no commitments on this question. If only
the most powerful can generate racial disrespect (which I doubt), then
only the powerful can be racist according to DA; but if even the powerless
can generate racial disrespect, then DA says that they could be racist too.
At other points, however, DA requires us to take some controversial
stands. For example, by characterizing racism in terms of racial disrespect, the analysis presented here implies that some race relations,
namely, the respectful ones, are not racist. Dummett deems such an
implication incoherent. He writes that “there is no aspect of race relations—as the term is normally and properly used—that does not have
racism at its root: ‘race relations’ is not normally applied to relations
between groups between which there is no friction or competition.”55
Now here Dummett is presuming the same basic principle for analysis
selection that I have been using: other things equal, one analysis is better
than another to the extent that it can in more respects preserve ordinary
ways of using race-related terms without running afoul of other analytic
virtues, such as consistency. But, in many places at least, it is not uncommon or improper to hear it used in ways other than those described
by Dummett. For instance, people sometimes talk of improved race relations. It even makes sense to talk about, and hope for, idyllic or peaceful
54. I owe this example to Meir Cohen.
55. Dummett, “The Nature of Racism,” 30.
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race relations, in which friction between racialized groups is a thing of
the past. Thus I think it is a strength of my account that it allows that
race relations are sometimes racist and other times not.56
My analysis also makes no claims as to the causal source of racism.
Some or all forms of racism might ultimately spring from our genetic
hardwiring, from a legacy of intergroup conflict, from being teased in
the schoolyard, or from whatever else: DA takes no stand on that question.
I consider this kind of neutrality virtuous, but it occasionally finds critics.
Michael P. Levine, for example, insists that a “causal account of racism,
in particular one that involves a psychological or psychoanalytic underpinning, is necessary to understanding what racism is.”57 To be sure, Levine
is making a claim about racism’s necessary boundaries: “Behavior that
appears racist but has no racist etiology is not—could not be—a form of
racism.”58 So, according to Levine, racism is necessarily etiological, and
on his particular diagnosis it originates in a certain form of “desire and
wish fulfillment,” without which a belief, behavior, or any other J could
not be racist. He thus provocatively claims that “trying to understand
racism . . . independently of a psychoanalytic approach is like trying to
understand motion without physics or how a car runs with no mention
of its engine. . . . There is no vacuum quite like a philosophical
vacuum.”59
Perhaps we need psychoanalytic theory to understand why people
are racist. (Perhaps.) I don’t think we need it to explain what racism is.
So what arguments might be given for a Levine-style etiological approach?
At one point, he distinguishes his view from nonetiological accounts by
allying it with externalist semantics.60 But semantic externalism is neither
here nor there: whether or not the reference or meaning of ‘racism’ is
wholly settled by what we think about racism, racism still might be definable without recourse to any of its psychological causes. Levine also tries
to marshal Putnam-style twin earth considerations, but the way he deploys
them is, to me, inscrutable. It does not seem too hard to imagine someone
(even on earth, let alone twin earth) who comes to have racist attitudes
that aren’t based in desire or wish fulfillment. Levine disagrees: he holds
that if a Martian came to an apparently racist attitude by a route other
than “perceived inadequacy” (the alleged source of human racism), “we
56. Dummett, of course, might have been trying to analyze ‘racism’ as it is used in
a different—if closely related—linguistic community than the one that governs the usage
that concerns this article. If so, then on this question our analyses might not be rivals as
much as complementary analyses that focus on different communities.
57. Michael P. Levine, “Philosophy and Racism,” in Levine and Pataki, Racism in Mind,
78–96, 78. Cf. Headley, “Philosophical Analysis,” 15.
58. Ibid., 90.
59. Ibid., 84.
60. Ibid., 89 n. 12.
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might call it racism, but we would understand it as importantly different
from the real thing.” But Levine does not tell us why, granting for argument’s sake that we would understand such alien attitudes as importantly different from run-of-the-mill human racism, we should think that
their attitudes are not racist. We get no reason to deny that seeking the
destruction of all Rs (and only because they are Rs) is racist, even when
it is based in alien ignorance, or even simple idiocy. But without an
argument, it’s hard to see why we should relinquish such an intuitive
proposition.61
Finally, return to the central claim that racism can be analyzed as
disrespect. Some might think that this is too weak: there’s more involved
in racism than disrespect—there’s also hatred, and malice, and murderous intent. Alternatively, some might think that DA expansively implies that too many things are racist: not every “racial ill,” as Blum puts
it, should be considered racist, especially given the deep moral significance that attaches to attributions of racism. Since anything that is
disrespectful toward members of R as Rs is racist according to DA, this
unpacking of ‘racist’ might seem to fall victim to what Blum, following
Robert Miles, calls the “conceptual inflation” of racism.62
Regarding the weakness objection, it is true that any account that
denied the awful viciousness of so many forms of racism would be inadequate. But DA does not issue such a denial. First, to say that all
instances of racism are instances of disrespect is not to deny that all or
many instances of racism might also be instances of something else.
The goal here has been to analyze the concept racism, not to enumerate
every single truth, not even every universal truth, about racism. (If all
horses have teeth, that doesn’t mean that having teeth is part of the
concept horse; we can, after all, at least conceptualize a toothless horse.)
So even if every known instance of racism were accompanied by intense
malice, this wouldn’t mean that intense malice is part of the concept
of racism. Second, given the possibility of benevolent racism, it seems
hard to deny that, while all instances of racism are and must be disrespectful, not all are malicious. Third, we have already seen that disrespect is a morally loaded notion. Further investigation would presumably
reveal the myriad ways in which the disrespect-makers can line up with
other morally troubling aspects of racism: that it can be malicious, that
it can cause severe harm, that it can corrode social relations, and so on.
61. Garcia (“Philosophical Analysis,” 10, 17, 26–27 n. 48, and “Heart of Racism,” 420)
suggests similar arguments against the kind of psychoanalytically sensitive account of which
Levine approves (particularly Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, The Anatomy of Prejudices [Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996]). Although Levine targets Garcia in particular, he does
not examine these arguments.
62. Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ”; Robert Miles, Racism (London: Routledge, 1989).
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One of the reasons that disrespect is a useful analysans for racism is
that disrespect is abstract enough to take as many forms as racism takes.63
These different forms can manifest different kinds (and degrees)64 of
morally troubling properties.
As for the possibility that DA leaves racism too inflated, whether this
is true will depend in large part on what we pretheoretically but critically
and reflectively consider instances of racism. Blum gives some examples
of racial ills that he identifies as currently labeled ‘racist’ but that should
not be labeled as such. While DA is consistent with Blum’s verdict in many
of these cases, and while his verdict is often compelling, some of his cases
do not seem persuasive to me. Consider his example of a high school
teacher asking a Haitian American student “to give ‘the black point of
view’” in a race-related classroom discussion. Blum holds that, although
such a question is insensitive and ignorant, it should not be considered
racist because it does not spring from inferiorization or antipathy.65 But
perhaps what we should do here is keep what Blum acknowledges is the
widespread recognition that such questions are racist and jettison the
inferiorization-or-antipathy approach to racism. DA, in fact, can step into
the breach and account for the apparent racism in the teacher’s request:
among other problems, it is racially disrespectful—presumably not just
to the individual in question but to all members of the racialized group
in question, as members of that group—to homogenize one racialized
group’s various distinctive points of view and to take one person’s perspective as representative of the entire group.66
So the short answer to the overinclusiveness objection is this. Some
things we call ‘racist’, other things we don’t. The goal here has been
to identify an account of racism that best captures ordinary everyday
discourse and thought. It seems to me that DA is no more expansive
than ordinary discourse allows it to be, and, given the goal, its limits
and expansiveness appear to be virtuous.
However, I should stress that I don’t mean to deny any of three
things here. First, recall that focusing on the ordinary concept allows
that we can deploy the term ‘racism’ in an incorrect manner. In fact,
while I have presupposed that we want an analysis that accommodates
ordinary usage as broadly as possible, the conclusion of my argument
63. Indeed, although I cannot argue for this here, I suspect that the flexibility of ‘respect’
might allow us to give parallel analyses of other ‘isms’. Vindicating that suspicion would
obviously require sustained considerations of the many forms of oppression.
64. For more on degrees of racism, see Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But . . . ,” 28–29.
65. Ibid., 53–57.
66. If homogenization can be disrespectful (e.g., because it fails to recognize us as
independent and distinctive), we should be confident that DA can also account for the
apparent racism in at least some positive stereotypes, the bitter jealousy and hatred sometimes
built upon those stereotypes, and any other related phenomena.
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entails that ‘racism’ is deployed correctly only when it conforms to DA.
Second, I don’t mean to deny that semantic externalism and the possibility of erroneous description might have a role to play: we can have
false beliefs about the nature of racism, and various experts, including
social theorists, might be able to shine a unique light on its nature and
meaning. But the best we can do, the best that even the experts can
do, is to look at how language works, consider not only the actual world
but also possible cases, widen our reflective equilibrium, and ultimately
render our best analysis. On these fronts, DA at least appears more
consistent with the variety of cases of racism than the alternatives considered here. Third, I don’t mean to deny that we also might want to
use and unpack the term ‘racism’ in a way that deviates from ordinary
usage but that serves various pragmatic or liberating ends.67 But investigating what our terms refer to and exploring what they could and
should refer to are attempts to paint two different pictures. DA is an
analysis of the former variety. Perhaps we’d be better off if we reserved
the term ‘racism’ for a different set of social ills than what it currently
covers; perhaps not. In either case, though, a focus on what it currently
covers is the constraint by which any descriptive analysis must abide.
The Disrespect Analysis is one way of trying to meet that constraint, and
its breadth is the product of that endeavor.

67. Blum, “What Do Accounts of ‘Racism’ Do?”; Haslanger, “Oppressions.”

